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HUSBAND AND WIFE UNDER FRENCH
LAW: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
Andre Tunc t
The revision of the French Civil Code by the Commission appointed in 1945 1 is the subject of continuing and careful consideration
by French lawyers. The discussions between members of the Com2 find a
mission, publicized by printing the Travaux priparatoires,
broad audience among law practitioners and teachers. Although
many points have been the subject of long argumentation, none of them
has raised the same passionate debate as the problem of the organization of the family. The conflict between the views of the commissioners has been dramatized by the resignation of one of them, an outstanding law teacher, Professor Henri Mazeaud. When the Commission decided to abrogate the traditional rule, still written in the French
Code, which states that the husband is "the head of the family," Professor Henri Mazeaud resigned and immediately stated the reasons for
his act in an article which stands as a powerful dissent: "A Family
Without a Head?" ' The Commission remained unimpressed by the
resignation and the article. The Avant-projet de Code Civil, which
appeared in 1954, places husband and wife on a complete footing of
equality, at least as far as their persons are concerned.
The problem should not be considered moot, as some people think.
The question is not merely one of stating or refusing to state the principle that the husband should be head of the family. From this principle, some important consequences follow. By one view, but not the
other, the choice of residence of the family belongs to the husband, the
wife being obliged to accept his decision unless authorized by the courts
to live separately. By the same view, to consider only the main aspects
t Professor, FacuMt6 de Droit, Universit6 de Grenoble.
1. See Julliot de La Morandiere, The Reform of the French Civil Code, 97
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1948) (Nadelmann transl.); cf. Nadelmann & Von Mehren,
Codification of French Conflicts Law, 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 404 (1952); Niboyet, La
question dun nouveau Code Civil en France, 29 TUL. L. REv. 253 (1955).
2. TRAvAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE REFORME DU CODE CIvIL (7 vols. 1945-1951).

3. MAZEAuD, Une Famille sans Cheff, [1951] DAuoz 141.
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et seq. See also the Commission's ExPosE

DES MOTIFS 105 (1954) and the translation
by Dainow, Preliminary Report of the Civil Code Reform Commission of France, 16
LA. L. REv. 1 (1955).
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of the problem, the wife cannot engage in a profession against the will
of her husband, again subject to appeal to the courts from her husband's decision. Moreover, even if the principle of predominance of
the husband is rarely applicable as such, it would have a persuasive
value: husband and wife would know that the wife should obey her
husband if they disagree on certain points.
The problem of the organization of the family under French law
shall be the subject of this article. The reader should remember, however, Portalis' warning: "Laws . . . must be adapted to the
character, to the habits, to the situation of the people for whom they
are drafted." I The problem cannot be discussed as an academic one.
Account must be taken of tradition and of French psychology. That
is the reason why it is necessary to consider past and present French
law before discussing its future.'
THE PAST

The status of the married woman, as it was at the eve of the
drafting of the Civil Code, was the result of a combination of many
factors.7 The first one was Roman law, which itself had experienced
5. Cf. Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code Napoleon, 29 TuL. L. REv. 431, 443

& n.41 (1955).
6. This paper will consiaer only husband and wife as far as persons are concerned.
It will not deal with the points on which equality is presently assured between husband
and wife. It seems self-evident, for instance, that husband and wife owe to each
other mutual fidelity, support and assistance. CoDE CIvm art. 212 (54th ed., Dalloz
1955). Such rules do not raise any discussion. For a comparative treatment of the
organization of the family, see Arminjon, Nolde & Wolff, TRArTE DE DROIT COMPARE
§§31, 89, 92, 144-47, 553, 613, 614, 623, 736, 863, 977, 1016 (3 vols. 1950-51); 2
TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT COMPARE, LA CONDITION DE LA FEMME
DANS LA SO-cIETE CONTEMPOAINE (Ancel ed. 1938); Dolle, L'egalite de l'homme et
de la femne dane le droit de la famille, 2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr COMPARA
[hereinafter REv. INT. DR. CoMp.] 250 (France 1950) ; Un nouveau Code de la fainille
en Tchcoslovaquie, 2 REv. INT. DR. COMp. 701 (France 1950); Un nouveau Code
de la famille en Bulgarie, 3 REv. INT. DR. CoMP. 304 (France 1951) ; Tchirkovitch,
Le code de la Famille en Yougoslavie, 3 REv. INT. DR. CoMP. 616 (France 1951);
Zajtay, Le droit du mariage dane le nouveau Code hongrois de la famille, 6 REv. INT.
DR. CoMP. 491 (France 1954).
On the financial organization of the family, see Ancel in 2 MATR0IONIAL PRopERTY LAW (W. Friedmann ed. 1955); Solus, Mari et femmne selon la loi du 22
Septembre 1942, 41 REvuE TRIMESTRIELL DE DRorr Cvrm 81 (France 1943); cf.
Community Property Symiposium, 15 LA. L. REv. 509 (1955). For discussion of the
provisions of the Avant-Projet, see Houin & Verrier, The Legal Marital Property
of the Code
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For a sociological and psychological study of the family, see also CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RESERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, SOCIOLOGIE COMPAREE DE LA FAMILLE CONTEMSUR LA PAMILLE (Institut National
PORAINE (1955); PRIGENT, RENOUVEAU DES IDL
d'Etudes Demographiques Cashier No. 18, 1954).
7. See 2 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRATE PRATIQUE DE DROrT CIVIL FRANCAIS §§ 374-97
(2d ed. 1952); 1 RmERT & BOULANGER, TAiTE ELEMENTAIRE DE Dsorr CVIL DE
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a long evolution. At its beginning, woman was placed by reason of
her physical weakness under a perpetual tutorship. The only effect of
marriage was to change her tutor: she escaped her father's authority
only to be placed under her husband's. At the end of an evolution
which we cannot describe here, woman was, on the contrary, entirely
free, as long as she was no longer a minor; and marriage did not affect
her capacity. Only very precise incapacities limited her rights. For
instance, she could not make herself surety for her husband. This rule
was laid down in 46 A. D. by Emperor Claudius in order to protect
her against an abuse of influence by her husband. This legal evolution,
however, had not been accompanied by a similar evolution of habits.
From literature, and even by what we still can observe in the rural
classes of Italy or Corsica, we know that, as a matter of habit, the wife
was usually kept under the very strong authority of her husband.
The second factor which influenced the status of the wife is the
doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, a doctrine shaped to a large
extent by Saint Paul. Saint Paul, in accordance with the prevailing
ideas of his time and those of the community, considered as a matter
of course that woman was an inferior creature. (This is one of the
reasons why she must cover her head before praying, while man may
address God bareheaded.) This view was, of course, qualified by his
sense of charity. The result is a beautiful-even though disputablecompromise, Saint Paul's epistle to the Ephesians, which is read to
the new spouses at the marriage Mass. According to Saint Paul's
views, the husband is the master of his wife and head of the family,
but he is head as Jesus is head of the Church. He must love her to
the point of being ready to sacrifice for her. To a certain extent, he is
responsible for her and will answer for her to God. The concept,
therefore, is very acceptable. It remains, however, that wives must be
"submissive to their husbands .

. since the husband is the master

of his wife."
German customs are the third and last factor which explain the
status of the wife in Ancient France. Under these customs, while the
unmarried woman was fully capable, the married woman was entirely
§§ 1777-1858 (5th ed. 1953) ; 1 JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, TRAITE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANCAIS DE AmRoiSE COLIN ET HENRI CAPITANT 649 (1953); 1 MAZEAUD,
LECoNs DE Dgorr CIVIL 1086 (1955); 1 CARmONNIER, DRorr cn-VI
353 (1955).
For a more detailed treatment of the matter, see 1 MoNIE11, MANUEL ELEMZNTAME
DE DROIT ROMAIN 210, 212, 230 (6th ed. 1947) ; GiDE, ETUDE SUR LA CONDITION PRvIE
DE LA FEmmE (2d ed. 1885) ; 2 B.IssAUD, MANUEL DHISTOME DU Dporr FRAN=Cis 87
(1898) ; LEFmvRE, LECONS D'INTRODUCTION GENERALE A L'HISTOIRE DU DROIT MATRImONIAL FRANCAIS 395, 456 (1900) ; LE DROFT DES GENS MARIES (1908), LE LIEN DU
mARIAGE 346 (1913), LA FAMLLE EN FRANCE DANS LE DROrr ET DANS LAS MOEURS
(1920) ; BONNECASE, LA PHILOSOPHIE DU CODE NAPOLEON APPLIQUEE AU DROIT DE LA
FAMMILE (2d ed. 1928); VIA.LAToN, L'AUTORITE mATALE SUR LA PERSONNE DE LA
PLANIOL

FEMME (1919).
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under her husband's power. Furthermore; in order to make the husband's power more effective, the married woman was placed under an
incapacity: she could do no legal act without her husband's consent.
This incapacity, however, was only a means to enforce the husband's
power. In case the husband was away for a long time or deprived of
his legal rights, the wife was automatically fully capable.
During the whole Ancien Regime, France was divided, as far as
the status of the wife was concerned, into two parts. North of the
Loire River, the customs had followed the German solutions; in the
South, solutions of Roman law had retained their authority as the
customary law of the provinces, but were to lose ground slowly under
the influence of northern customs. In both parts of the country, furthermore, the weight of habit made women and, therefore, wives, quite
inferior to men, while the Roman Catholic Church emphasized on the
contrary, the duties of husbands towards their wives.
Although, as has been said, the northern customs were gaining
ground at the end of the Ancien Regime, a reciprocal Roman law influence affected these customs. The revival of Roman law studies during
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries led some legal teachers and writers
of northern France to discover the wife's incapacity to be a surety for
her husband. Attention was given to this rule at the end of the sixteenth century. The results were twofold. On the one hand, the
rule was repealed by a royal edict of August 1606. On the other
hand, some legal writers, on the basis of secondary texts of the Roman
period, explained it, not by the necessity of protecting wives against
husbands' influence, but by the "weakness" of women as such ("propter
inbecillitatem sexus"). "Weakness" was termed to mean mental as
well as physical weakness, or, at least, lack of experience. The idea
was historically wrong. It also ran contrary to logic: it would not
have explained why only married women received protection, unless
woman's consent to marriage be accepted as a token of her mental
weakness-a very pessimistic view indeed. Nevertheless, the idea
gained authority during the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth
century, its authority was such that it was decided, contrary to the
previous solution, that, if a husband was away for a long time, or
insane, or deprived of his legal rights, his wife would not recover her
capacity, and would not be able to do any legal act without authorization by the courts.
Therefore, at the eve of the Civil Code, two or three ideas were
the basis of the wife's incapacity which was the rule-at least in the
northern half of France; the necessity of keeping the wife under the
husband's influence and the "weakness" of women. The idea of pro-
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tection against the husband's abuses of influence was not completely
forgotten but was in the background.
The provisions of the Civil Code relating to the wife's status were
drafted under the influence of Bonaparte, who clearly believed that
women were very inferior creatures. His life as a soldier-and probably his shyness and his ambition-had reinforced the ideas that he
had inherited from his birthplace, Corsica.
These ideas explain why a reinforcement of the traditional incapacity of the married woman may be found in the original provisions
of the Code. The two basic provisions dealing with status of the wife
are articles 213 and 217. Article 213 reads as follows: "The husband
owes protection to his wife; the wife owes obedience to her husband."
Article 217 states: "The wife, even when she is separate in estate from
her husband, cannot grant, alienate, mortgage, acquire, either by
gratuitous or incumbered title, unless her husband concurs in the act,
or yields his consent in writing." 8
Many provisions follow from these principles. "The wife is bound
to live with her husband and to follow him wherever he chooses to
reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and to furnish her with
whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to his
means and condition."
(Article 214).' "The wife can not appear
in court without the authorization of her husband, although she may
be a public merchant, or possess her property separate from her husband."

(Article 215).1"

It appears, therefore, that the wife is placed under her husband's
authority and furthermore made incapable. Since the unmarried
woman is not incapable, the second rule must be explained by the first:
the incapacity is only a means to make the husband's authority more
effective. No other reason may be given for it. Evidence of the validity of this explanation may be found in Article 218: "If the husband
refuses to empower his wife to appear in court, the judge may give her
such authorization," "1 and in Article 219: "If the husband refuses to
empower his wife to perform a legal act, the wife may cause him to be
cited to appear before the court, which may authorize her to perform
such act, or refuse to authorize her, after the husband has been heard,
or has been duly called to court." 12 Thus, a judicial authorization to
appear in court or to perform a legal act is a protection for the wife
8. Cf. LA. Crv. CODE
9. Cf. id. art. 120.
10. Cf. id. art. 121.
11. Cf. id. art. 124.
12. Cf. id. art. 125.

ANN.

art. 122 (West 1952).
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against an unreasonable use of authority by.the husband. This confirms
the hypothesis that incapacity may be explained only by this authority.
A departure from this justification of incapacity is found, however,
in Article 222, which repeats the rule introduced in the eighteenth
century: "If the husband is under interdiction or absent, the judge may,
when satisfied of the fact, authorize the wife to appear in court or to
contract." 18 This rule was as illogical under the Code as it had been
originally. If an unmarried woman may appear in court or contract
without any authorization, one fails to see why the same should not
be true for a married woman whose husband is under interdiction or
absent, especially since the appearance in court or the contract cannot,
by reason of the legal matrimonial regime, have any financial repercussion on the husband. The same lack of logic may be found in Article
225: "Proceedings to annul the acts of the wife for lack of authorization can be instituted 6nly by the wife or the husband or by their
heirs." 14 One understands why the husband may obtain the annulment of an act which disregards his authority, but not why the wife
may disregard her own signature when the husband would respect it.
THE PRESENT

The present law results from amendments made to the provisions
of the Civil Code by statutes on February 18, 1938 and September 22,
194 2.
The statute of 1938 put an end to the incapacity of married
women. It did not change, however, any rule of community property
or any other matrimonial regime. Nor did it eliminate the husband's
predominance over the wife. The drafters of the statute were satisfied
in abolishing the duty of obedience previously expressed in Article 213
and in giving to the wife recourse to the courts against certain decisions
which could be made by her husband.
The statute of 1942 is to a certain extent a continuation of the
reform of 1938. Its main impact is upon the rules of the matrimonial
regimes. However, it deals also with personal relations of the spouses.
It further weakens the husband's supremacy and gives another wording
to most of the Code provisions relating to family organization.
13. See also CODE CIVIt art. 221 (54th ed., Dalloz 1955); cf. LA. CIrv. CODE ANCN.
art. 132 (West 1952).
14. Cf. id. art. 134.
15. On the present law, see PLAIOL & RmERT, op. Cit. Mupra note 7; 7 AuBRY ET
RAu, DR0IT CaVIL FRANCAIS § 471, 472 (Esmein ed. 1948); 1 RiPERT & BOULANGER,
op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 1787-858; 1 JULOIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 662; 1 MAzEAUD, op. cit. upra note 7, at 1008; 1 CARBONNIE, op. Cit. supra note
7, at 342; SOLUS, sukra note 6; Julliot de la Morandiere, La loi du 22 septembre 1942
sur la effets du mariage quant aux droits et devoirs des epoux, 1 JURIs-CLAsSEUR
PERlODIQuE 304 (1943).
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The present picture of the family organization under the Code is
as follows. Article 213, since 1938, lays down the principle that the
husband is considered "head of the family." That principle, however,
was not directly stated in 1938. It appeared first incidentally in a
sentence governing the problem of the residence of the family: "The
husband, head of the family, has the choice of the residence of the household .

.

.

."

It appeared again in the third paragraph of the pro-

vision, stating the circumstances under which "the quality of head of
the family would cease to exist to the benefit of the husband." The
drafters of the statute of 1942 considered that this quality of the husband deserved to be stated as a basic principle and that, at the same
time, the position of the wife should be made more precise. The present text is as follows:
"The husband is the head of the family. He exercises this
function in the common interest of the spouses and the children.-The wife cooperates with the husband to insure the moral
and material guidance of the family, to look after his living, to
rear the children and to prepare them for their future.-The wife
replaces the husband in his function of head of the family if he is
unable to express his will by reason of his incapacity, of his absence, of his remoteness or for any other reason."
Whatever may be the merits of the proposed revision of Article
213-a question which will be discussed in part III of this paperthe value of the present version must be recognized. The theory is
that since any human group needs an organ of guidance and decision,
the husband is made the head of the family, by reason of his usually
greater and broader experience. However, the wife is no longer the
inferior creature conceived by the Romans and Bonaparte. She is
associated with her husband to insure the management of the family.
She is also an alternate for her husband. Nothing remains comparable
to the rule introduced in the eighteenth century and embodied in the
former Article 222 "1for the cases of interdiction and absence.
The problem of the residence of the family is no longer dealt with
in Article 214, as in 1804, nor in Article 213, as in 1938, but is now
dealt with in Article 215 which, restating with more clarity the solution adopted in 1938, provides:
"The right to choose the residence of the family belongs to
the husband; the wife is obliged to live with him and he is obliged
to receive her. When the residence chosen -by the husband presents for the family dangers of physical or moral nature, the wife
16. See text at note 13 "upra.
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may, by exception, be authorized to have, for herself and for her
children, another residence, decided upon by the judge."
The idea, therefore, is kept that the wife must "follow" her husband, even though the word is eliminated. However, the wife may
be relieved from this obligation, for herself and her children, by
judicial authorization, whenever the courts find it reasonable.
The principle of incapacity of married women stated in Articles
215 and 217, previously discussed,1" and all its consequences as elaborated in the other provisions of the Chapter, are eliminated. The
principle of full capacity is stated in Article 216: ':A married woman
has full legal capacity. The exercise of this capacity is limited only
by the contract of marriage and by statutes."
A new provision expressly deals with the power of the wife to
engage in a profession. Before 1938, the wife, being incapable of any
legal act without her husband's authorization, could not engage in a
profession. The principle was so clear that it was not even stated in
the Civil Code. Only as far as commercial activities were concerned,
was it expressed in Article 4 of the Commercial Code: "The wife
cannot be a public merchant without her husband's consent." The
abrogation of the incapacity of the wife would have led logically to a
recognition of her power to engage in a profession. It was felt, however, in 1938, that the primary duties of the wife were at home and
that the husband, as head of the family, should have control over his
wife's activity. It was then stated in Article 216 that the husband
would have the power to object to his wife's engaging in a separate
profession. If, however, the objection was not justified by the interest of the household or of the family, the wife could be authorized by
the court to disregard her husband's objection. This rule was not
applicable to a commercial activity. Probably by reason -of the danger
of a commercial activity, as opposed to the activity of the wife as
lawyer, physician, dentist or employee, the drafters did not change
Article 4 of the Commercial Code.
By rephrasing the relevant provisions and changing Article 4 of
the Commercial Code, the statute of 1942 goes further toward the
wife's freedom concerning her activity. The principle stated in Article 223, section 1 is now that "the wife may hold a profession separate
from her husband's profession, unless the husband objects to it." The
principle is merely echoed in Article 4 of the Commercial Code: "The
wife may be public merchant unless her husband objects to it." The
rule should be respected by everybody. An employer cannot keep a
17. See p. 1068 4upra.
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wife among his employees, a Bar Association cannot keep a wife
among its members and a court must refuse to consider her as a lawyer,
nor may a Physicians' Association keep a wife among its members or
permit her to exercise her profession, if the husband objects to her
activity. Furthermore: "Obligations incurred by the wife in the
exercise of this profession cannot be claimed against the husband by
the persons with whom she contracted, if such persons had personal
knowledge of the objection at the time they dealt with the wife." 18
Recourse is still given to the courts: "If the husband's objection is not
justified by the interest of the family, the wife may be authorized by
the judge to disregard it, in which case, the professional obligations
incurred from the time of the objection are fully valid toward the
husband." 19

Disregarding the other provisions of the Chapter, which relate
to the powers of each of the spouses to perform a legal act, either on
his own property notwithstanding the powers of the other spouse, or
on the other spouse's property by means of a power of attorney or
judicial authorization," it may not be difficult to observe the merits
and the weakness of the present law.
Two merits must be recognized. First, the present law clears
French law of the weight of a tradition which appears without justification today. The incapacity of a married woman, to the extent
that it was not a means of reenforcing the husband's supremacy, was
a mere historical misconception. As for the husband's absolute authority over the wife, it was a survival, or rather a resurgence, of
ideas fought against by the Church from its very beginning and which
are shocking to modem consciences. At the same time-and this is
the second merit of the present law-the present system reasonably
preserves the cohesion of the family by giving it a head and by precisely
stating the respective responsibilities of husband and wife, whereas a
mere statement of equality between them may permit a dissociation
of the family.
The weakness of the law, however, is as obvious as its merits.
In order to moderate the authority of the husband over the wife, permission is given to the wife to have recourse to courts, at least under
certain circumstances. This recourse appears extremely dangerous.
How can we conceive husband and wife litigating against each other
and still keep the hope of maintaining them as members of a united
18. CoDE Crvm art. 223,

§

2 (54th ed., Dalloz 1955).

19. Id. art. 223, §3.
20. Cf. articles cited in note 6 supra.
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family? It has been said that once they have learned the way to the
courts, they will use it for divorce. Whether this prognostication is
entirely true is disputable. The truth seems rather to be that recourse
to courts is a remedy open only to spouses who are already on very
bad terms. It cannot be a means to solve a special and temporary disagreement between happy spouses. It can be only a means to avoid
excesses of power by a husband or excesses of liberty by a wife when
the spouses are already in permanent and basic disagreement, whether
they are already in litigation over a divorce, or ready to introduce a
suit, or only living separately. As a matter of fact, the recourse to the
courts is very exceptional. Although it may avoid some hardship,
it cannot be a normal means to balance the husband's authority.
THE FUTURE
The drafters of the new Code were thus confronted with a very
difficult task.2 '
The present system, which tends to establish the husband's moderately authoritarian control over the wife and the family, although not
a failure, is far from satisfactory. The recourse to courts, as has been
said, can work only as a very exceptional remedy, and is not free from
dangers.
Nobody, of course, would advocate a return to the absolute authority established in 1804. On the contrary, many people would be
willing to state a complete equality between husband and wife, as
between man and woman-equality not being synonymous with
identity.
On the other hand, a complete equality between husband and wife
may tend towards dissociation of the family. An example of the
danger may be found in Soviet law. Complete equality is established
by Articles 7-16 of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Laws on Marriage,Family
and Guardianship (1926), a typical provision being Article 9 which
reads as follows:
"Both husband and wife shall enjoy full liberty in the choice
of occupation or profession. The manner in which their joint
household is conducted shall be determined by mutual agreement
of the spouses. A change of residence by either husband or wife
shall not oblige the other to follow." 2
21. On the conflicting views, see documents referred to in notes 3 and 4 supra;
see also MAZEAUD, op. cit. *upra note 7, at'1088 et seq.; La fantille dans l'ordre
juridique, 31 LEs cAsEIRms Du DRor 37 (1954).
22. 2 GsovsKr, Sov=r Civ LAw 243 (1949).
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Of course, the fact that equality is accepted by Soviet law cannot
be an argument for or against it. But one may ask what remains of
our concept of a family if husband and wife are free to live miles away
from each other. It is true that the family is now the object of much
respect and attention from the Soviet government.
It seems clear,
however, that provisions such as Article 9 of the R.S.F.S.R. Code do
not aid in the materialization of this new policy.
Facing the difficulties or the dangers inherent in any course of
action, one first must recognize that the law is presently an instrument
which cannot be delicate enough to govern the relationships between
husband and wife as far as their persons are concerned. To establish
an absolute authority of the husband over the wife, as did the Civil
Code, was technically feasible. As soon, however, as the aim of the
legislator is moderate authority, an authority founded only on the
necessity to maintain the cohesion in the society formed between two
partners-husband and wife, who are basically equal-the legislator
cannot state any rule which would be applicable as a rule of law nor
create any remedy which would be delicate enough not to create a
danger of tension and dissociation between the two members of the
society.
Having recognized this fact, one might be led to think that the
legislator should take his hands off the problem. However, to abstain
from stating anything would be-husband and wife being equal as
citizens-to adopt impliedly the system of complete equality as it is
under Soviet law. The problem cannot be escaped.
The problem may be considered from another point of view.
"Laws," as stated by Portalis, "are not pure acts of will." The legislator must not consider in the abstract what he thinks desirable. He
must also consider the habits and the desires of the people. However,
from this angle, the problem does not appear clearer.
As a matter of fact, public opinion is certainly confused in France
on the respective status of husband and wife. The husband's predominance is generally recognized. in some classes of France, especially
in the rural classes and in the South. Currently, among workers, on
the other hand, and quite often in the "bourgeois" classes, the wife is
"the government" of the family. If the current opinions are considered, many people will be found in favor of the idea that, man and
woman being equal, still husband and wife should not be equal because
no society can endure without a head. This is, for instance, the opinion
very strongly expressed by Professor Henri Mazeaud in the previously
23. See 1 id. at 111 (1948) ; HAZARD, LAW AND S0mAL CHANGE iN = U.S.S.R.
245 (1953).
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But it -may be answered that, if an ordinary
mentioned article.'
society cannot live without a head,_the same is not true for the society
of a husband and wife, not only because it is a society of two, but
because mutual love makes common decisions and reciprocal adjustment of the personalities more facile. Being based on love, the husband
and wife society may settle itself and consolidate itself without any
head; the respective values and responsibilities of the spouses will establish their respective authorities.
Professor Henri Mazeaud also considers that the spouses who are
members of the Roman Catholic Church or of most of the Reformed
Churches must recognize the supremacy of the husband, according to
Saint Paul's epistle to the Ephesians already noted.' This view again
is disputed. The Arcanum encyclic of 1880 and the Casti Connubii of
1930 are much more elaborate and qualified than Saint Paul's epistle.
Some Catholics consider that the only final aim of the Church in the
organization of the family is the harmony between the spouses, and that
predominance of the husband is taught only as the normal, but not necessary, means of obtaining harmony. Some of them even believe that
the Church has played an eminent role in the emancipation of the
woman and that, if tradition still gives the husband some predominance,
the Church should continue to lead the way toward the possibility of
a full opening of female personality, married as well as unmarried.
The drafters of the Avant-Projet were thus confronted with a
baffling problem. If the solutions they gave are -not perfect oneswe shall try to risk a judgment on them after having explained them
-everybody will admit that they are a careful compromise, and to a
certain extent, a happy reconciliation between the various views. The
drafters had, of course, to make a basic decision on the problem of
hierarchy or equality between spouses and they chose equality. But
they worked out new rules dearly designed to avoid the dangers which
might result from equality.
Article 319 of the Avant-Projet states, as does present Article
212, "Spouses owe to each other mutual fidelity, support and assistance."
-Article 320, on the other hand, is a complete departure from
present Article 213. Even though it does not state equality as suchas a right given to the wife against her husband-it places husband
and wife on an equal footing in the direction of the family:
"Spouses concur, in the interest of the family, to assure its
moral and financial gidance, to raise the children and prepare
24. Mazeaud, suPra note 3.
25. See p. 1066 upra.
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them for their future. If one of the spouses is incapable, or if he is
absent, or sentenced for desertion, the other exercises alone the
authority mentioned in the first paragraph. The same will occur
if one of the spouses voluntarily abandons the common life or is
unable to express his will by reason of his remoteness or by any
other reason."
With the desire of avoiding the dangers inherent in Article 9 of
the R.S.F.S.R. Code, Article 321 states as a basic principle: "Spouses
are held to live together." The principle is carried into effect as follows: "If they cannot agree on the choice of their common residence,
each of them may, in the interest of the family, ask the court to decide
where this residence will be or to authorize him to have a separate
residence for himself and those of his children who shall be entrusted
to him." The comparison with the present Article 215 is easy. While
Article 215 leaves full freedom for the husband to reside where he
chooses and obliges the wife to follow him, subject to her obtaining a
judicial exemptiofi, prospective Article 321 would permit each of
the spouses to ask the court to decide on the family residence or to
authorize him to have a separate residence. Equality between husband
and wife would thus be obtained at the cost of an extension of recourse
to the courts.
The same may be said of prospective Article 326, as opposed to
present Article 223. The former reads as follows: "Each of the spouses
may exercise the profession of his choice, unless the other spouse asks
the court to forbid the latter, in the interest of the family, to exercise
this profession." Again, this provision extends the scope of recourse
to the courts. Again, it makes the husband lose his full freedom. As
far as the wife is concerned, on the contrary, it weakens his control
over her activity. While the husband may presently prohibit her from
engaging in a profession, subject to her appeal to the court, the husband
under the Avant-Projet would only be able to ask the court to prohibit
her from exercising the profession.
A last consequence of the equality established between husband
and wife may be found in Article 210 of the Avant-Projet, which provides: "Each of the spouses may use the name of the other, unless the
latter, in the interest of the family, asks the court to prohibit the former
from using his name." This provision has no precedent in the present
Civil Code, but may be compared with Article 7 of the R.S.F.S.R.
Code, according to which: "On registering a marriage, the spouses
may declare their desire to use a common surname, that of either the
husband or the wife, or to retain their antenuptial surnames." 2
26. 2 Gsovsxr, Sovier Ciwr. LAw 242 (1949).
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To express an opinion on the provisions which have just been reproduced may be, if presumptuous, a duty for the writer. In his judgment, the provision which deserves bitter criticism is also the least
important. To state that "each of the spouses may use the name of
the other" seems both unrealistic and ridiculous. The intention of the
drafters as it appears from the expose des motifs 27 was to permit the
wife, according to the general custom, to use her husband's name,
or to permit the spouses, as is sometimes done in certain provinces, to
associate their names. This intention, if it was the only intention of
the drafters, is completely betrayed by the wording of the provision.
As the provision is now drafted, it permits each of the spouses to continue to use his own name. This practice would be contrary to the
present one. The least that can be said is that it would not help cohesion of the family. While "false spouses" are careful to introduce
themselves under the same name, "true spouses" might introduce themselves as "John A. and Mary B." Since the children bear the name
of the father, they would not bear the same name as the mother. The
spouses might also decide to adopt as a common name, the wife's
name, which would be strange and possibly misleading for third parties. Furthermore, if the spouses have a very strong sense of humor,
John A. might choose to become, by reason of his marriage, John B.,
while Mary B. would become Mary A. All these consequences may
not be very serious for the family. They are at least unfortunate. It
is submitted that it would have been better for the drafters, either to
say nothing on the matter, and to leave it as it is now according to
custom, or to state that the wife shall take her husband's name (which
should not give her any inferiority complex) unless the spouses decide to associate their names.
Articles 326 and 321 will be the subject of much discussion, as
they have been among the members of the Commission. It is submitted, however, that they do not create a serious danger for the
family. Granted that the exercise of a profession by-the wife may be
more dangerous for the family than the exercise of a certain profession
by the husband, nonetheless the wife is highly interested in the kind of
activity which will be taken up by the husband, and she may have a
better appreciation of the consequences of his activity for the family.
27. "According to the traditional custom,,the project allows each of the spouses
to use the other's name; but it extends the judicial rule which prevents the wife from
using her husband's name when the husband disapproves of her exercising a liberal
or artistic profession; from now on, each of the spouses will be authorized to ask the
court, in the interest of the family, to prohibit the other from using his name (art.
210)." COmmISSION DE PEOxRmE DU CODE CIvIL, ExPosE msS MoTIFs 84.
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This interest and this possibility of judgment should lead the husband
to give great weight to the desires of his spouse and to her arguments.
Obviously, it is highly desirable that the matter be settled between the
spouses themselves. If, however, this appears impossible, should not
the interest of the wife and children materialize in the possibility of
recourse to the courts, unfortunate as this recourse may appear? Since
most people will agree that the wife should not be free to engage in
a profession and since the husband presently owns a veto power on her
activity, subject to the final decision of the courts, is there a good
reason not to give her, reciprocally, a certain control over the activity
of the husband, at least through the courts? This recourse should be
and will be very exceptional, as is presently the exercise by the husband
of his veto power and the appeal to the courts by the wife. It may,
however, be the last resort to avoid a very unfortunate decision, and
it will oblige the husband to give greater consideration to his wife's
arguments-it will increase her "bargaining power." Some judges
even feel that they could play a certain role when serious decisions are
to be taken by the household. They would like to have the opportunity to listen informally to the complaint of a spouse, to ask the
other spouse, simply by letter, to come and discuss the matter with them
-- outside the court room and without any lawyer-and to try to lead
the spouses toward the more reasonable solution. What has been said
for the problem of choice of profession might be repeated for the problem of choice of residence. Both of them are quite often linked.
Finally, if a statement of the respective position of husband and
wife must be made in the Code, the writer prefers the prospective Article 320 to the present Article 213. The question has been discussed
whether it was necessary or even proper for the legislator to state a
rule which could not be enforced by the courts. The writer believes
with Professor Henri Mazeaud that the legislator should not remain
silent on such a basic point as the respective positions of husband and
wife, and that the rule he gives will be spontaneously respected by many
spouses or at least will have an influence on their behaviour. He disagrees with Professor Mazeaud on the rule which should be stated by
the legislator. Although a Catholic, as Professor Mazeaud, he does
not consider, for aforesaid reasons, that the Church imposes a supremacy of the husband, even as a means of obtaining the harmony between
the spouses. He considers, furthermore, that under the weight of
Roman tradition and also by reason of their usually greater responsibilities, many French husbands, although of good will, show a certain
pride and a certain authoritarianism which are a source of sufferings-

1956]

HUSBAND AND WIFE UNDER FRENCH LAW

1079

sometimes more or less conscious-for the wives. If a principle must
be stated which will have mainly an educational value, he feels that the
best directive 'which may be given to the spouses is that they will concur
in assuring the direction of the family. Such a directive will permit
each spouse to gain the recognized authority he deserves in a certain
field of problems. It will help toward a just and natural adjustment
of the personalities.

